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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
I. THE EARLY INSIGNIFICANCE OF THE
FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Free Exercise Violations Abridging the Freedom of Speech
The scope of protection that the United States Supreme Court has
accorded to the free exercise of religion under the first amendment
has been quite limited. It was not until 1940, in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,1 that the Court first invalidated government action on free exer-
cise grounds, also holding the free exercise provision of the first
amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth amend-
ment. But free speech principles played a decisive role in that
landmark case. Cantwell involved a group of Jehovah's Witnesses
who canvassed a neighborhood playing anti-Catholic records on a port-
able phonograph in an effort to sell religious materials and solicit con-
tributions. One member of the group was convicted under a state
statute that required solicitors to obtain a license, which would not be
issued without a state official's determination that the solicitor's cause
was genuinely religious, charitable or philanthropic. The Court, ob-
jecting to the degree of discretion that the statute granted the official
and relying on decisions involving freedom of speech, invalidated the
statute as a prior restraint of both free speech and free exercise of
religion.2
The Court's opinion in West Virginia State Board of Education v.
Barnette3 illustrates the point that virtually all cases thereafter find-
ing a free exercise violation involved government regulation of reli-
gious speech or belief. In Barnette, Jehovah's Witnesses maintained
that their religious bar on the worship of graven images prohibited
their children from complying with a state requirement that public
school students salute the flag of the United States while repeating
the Pledge of Allegiance. The Court explicitly declined to decide the
case on free exercise grounds in order to encompass the rights of those
who might object to the requirement for non-religious reasons. 4 After
finding that the flag salute ritual constituted symbolic speech, the
Court held that the regulation violated the first amendment guarantee
of freedom of expression because it compelled students to express ac-
ceptance of certain political ideas.5
Since the religious liberty claims in Cantwell and Barnette, as well
1. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
2. Id at 304-07 (relying on Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)). See also id at
303 n.3 (citing Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
3. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
4. Id at 634-35 ("While religion supplies appellees' motive for enduring the discom-
forts of making the issue in this case, many citizens who do not share these reli-
gious views hold such a compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the
individual." (footnote omitted)).
5. Id at 633-34.
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as in almost all freedom of religion cases, could have been vindicated
without reference to the free exercise clause,6 these casesare better
understood as free speech cases, rather than as indicators of how the
Court would evaluate governmental regulation of religious conduct.
B. Rejection of Free Exercise Claims Involving Religiously Motivated
Conduct
The more significant issue for religious liberty arises when a free
exercise claim is pressed without the support of an alleged free speech
violation. Under what circumstances do general government regula-
tions of conduct, enacted for secular purposes (i.e., without religious
motivation), violate the free exercise clause if they conflict with an
individual's religious tenets? Until 1963, the answer was never. In
every earlier case involving generally applicable laws whose effect pe-
nalized or otherwise burdened conduct mandated by religious belief
or, conversely, whose effect required or otherwise encouraged conduct
forbidden by religious belief, the Court rejected the free exercise
claim.
For example, in Reynolds v. United States,7 a Mormon convicted of
violating an antipolygamy statute raised the defense that he had acted
in accordance with his religious precepts.8 The Court, drawing a sharp
distinction between beliefs and actions, held that while government
regulations cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions,
they may with practices that are "in violation of social duties or sub-
versive of good order."9
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Court maintained this distinction,
although softening it somewhat. The Court declared in a famous dic-
tum that the free exercise clause "embraces two concepts, -freedom
to believe and freedom to act,"10 but reasoned that religious belief is
entitled to "absolute" protection, whereas religious conduct remains
"subject to regulation for the protection of society,"' 1 although the
government's "power to regulate [such conduct] must be so exercised
as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the protected
freedom."12
6. In fact, many of the Court's most prominent free speech rulings have involved
religious expression or related activities such as proselytization or solicitation.
See Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV.
579, 581-82, and cases cited therein.
7. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
8. Mormon doctrine required male members to practice polygamy, circumstances
permitting, and held that the penalty for failure or refusal to practice polygamy
"would be damnation in the life to come." Id at 248.
9. 98 U.S. at 164.
10. CantweU v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
11. Id. at 303-04.
12. Id. at 304.
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The principle originating in Reynolds and reiterated in Cantwell,
that the government may generally regulate religious conduct to fos-
ter the welfare of society, led the Court to reject a free exercise claim
in Prince v. Massachusetts.13 A Jehovah's Witness was convicted of
violating state child labor laws by furnishing her nine year-old niece
with religious materials to sell on the street. She contended first that
the laws violated her right (as her niece's legal guardian) to pass on
her faith to her niece, and second that the laws infringed upon her
niece's free exercise rights.14 The Court initially declared that it was
within the state's police power to enact "legislation appropriately
designed" to protect children from "the crippling effects of child em-
ployment," and that "the validity of such a prohibition applied to chil-
dren not accompanied by an older person hardly would seem open to
question."15 The Court then decided that the presence of an adult
would not provide sufficient protection against the dangers the state
sought to prevent, for street evangelism could "create situations diffi-
cult enough for adults to cope with and wholly inappropriate for chil-
dren, especially of tender years, to face."16 The Court deferred to the
state as parens patriae in upholding the application of Massachusetts'
child labor prohibition.
The Court again rejected a free exercise objection to a generally
applicable law regulating conduct in Braunfeld v. Brown.17 Orthodox
Jewish merchants contended that a state statute requiring persons to
close their businesses on Sunday violated their free exercise rights.
Because their faith already required them to abstain from work on
Saturday, the Jewish merchants were at a competitive disadvantage
with others who closed only on Sunday. The Court rejected the claim,
distinguishing between laws that directly burden free exercise by
prohibiting the religious practice itself and those that cause only indi-
rect burdens to be suffered, such as the economic consequences that
the merchants were experiencing. In the former situation, the Court
observed,
to make accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state
authority is a particularly delicate task because resolution in favor of the State
results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious princi-
ple or facing criminal prosecution.
1 8
The Sunday closing law, by contrast, "does not make unlawful any
13. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
14. In accordance with her beliefs, Prince regularly distributed religious materials
and solicited contributions on city streets, and the niece testified to her belief that
failure to perform such work would result in her eternal condemnation. Id at
161-63.
15. Id. at 168-69.
16. Id at 169-70.
17. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
18. Id at 605 (citation omitted).
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religious practices"; it "simply regulates a secular activity and operates
so as to make the practice of... [the merchants'] religious beliefs more
expensive."1 9 The Court did not hold in Braunfeld that all indirect
burdens upon the exercise of religion resulting from laws that are sec-
ular in purpose and effect are constitutionally permissible, however.
If "the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not im-
pose such a burden," the law would be invalid as applied.20
II. THE COURT VITALIZES THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
In 1963 the Court abandoned Braunfeld's distinction between di-
rect and indirect impacts upon religious conduct, and afforded reli-
gious action a level of constitutional protection that it had not before
enjoyed. In Sherbert v. Verner,21 an employer discharged a mill
worker, a Seventh Day Adventist who, in accordance with her beliefs,
refused to work on Saturday when the mill shifted to a six-day work
week. After failing to locate employment with a five-day work week
at any of the other mills in the area, the employee filed a claim for
state unemployment compensation. She was denied benefits under a
statute that disqualified unemployed persons who failed to accept
"suitable work." The Court held that "to condition the availability of
benefits upon... [her] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her
religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitu-
tional liberties."22
The Court then applied what has come to be known as the test of
"strict scrutiny." It first inquired whether "some compelling state in-
terest ... justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First
Amendment right."23 The Court found no evidence to support a state
purpose in preventing "the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous
claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work," and no
other state interest was advanced.24 Even if the state were able to
demonstrate that it had a sufficiently important interest at stake, the
Court continued, "it would plainly be incumbent upon .. . [it] to
demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat
such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights."25
Sherbert distinguished Braunfeld on the ground that the economic
burden upon the Orthodox Jewish merchants was "saved by a coun-
tervailing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case-a
strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all work-
19. Id
20. Id at 607 (citing CantweU v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940)).
21. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
22. Id- at 406.
23. IM
24. Id at 407.
25. Id.
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ers."2 6 Nevertheless, it is clear that a doctrinal shift had taken place
with Sherbert: the Braunfeld Court upheld the statute on the basis of
its direct versus indirect burdens distinction without employing a
"strict scrutiny" analysis. For the Braunfeld Court, it was only impor-
tant that the uniform day of rest was a secular governmental objective
(not that it was an especially strong one) that could not be as effec-
tively achieved by means that would not burden the free exercise of
religion.27
The Burger Court reaffirmed Sherbert's holding in Thomas v. Re-
view Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division,28 with
(then Associate) Justice Rehnquist the only dissenter.29 Thomas, a
Jehovah's Witness, left his job as a metal worker after being trans-
ferred into a division that manufactured tank turrets because his reli-
gious beliefs prevented him from participating in the production of
war materials. The state agency denied him unemployment benefits
on the ground that he had not left for "good cause [arising] in connec-
tion with [his] work," as required by statute.30 Having found a signifi-
cant government-imposed burden on religious practice, the Court's
opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, applied Sherbert's strict
scrutiny standard: "The state may justify an inroad on religious lib-
erty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some
compelling state interest."3 1 Indiana argued that its interests in
preventing a flood of unemployment claims from draining its fund and
in avoiding employer inquiry into the religious beliefs of job applicants
justified the burden, but the Court found no evidence suggesting that
either interest was threatened.32
Six years later, Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission 33
presented the Court with facts virtually identical to those of Sherbert
and Thomas. The state agency did not even attempt to demonstrate a
26. Id at 408.
27. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961). Moreover, the Braunfeld Court was
quite lenient in finding this second part of its test satisfied. The Orthodox Jewish
merchants suggested an alternative means of providing for a weekly day of rest
that would not restrict religious liberty; people who, for religious reasons, already
observe a day of rest other than Sunday could be exempted from the law. In
response the Court acknowledged, "A number of States provide such an exemp-
tion, and this may well be the wiser solution to the problem," but rejected the
suggestion on the basis of speculation as to why it might not be an equally effec-
tive means of achieving the state's goal. Id at 608-09 (footnote omitted).
28. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
29. Justice Rehnquist would have applied Braunfeld's distinction between direct and
indirect burdens on religious practice to find that the state's "general statute, the
purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals," did not vio-
late the free exercise clause. Id, at 722-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
30. I& at 712.
31. Id at 718.
32. I& at 718-19.
33. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
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compelling state interest as strict scrutiny requires, arguing instead
that the less rigorous standard that had recently been articulated by
Chief Justice Burger in Bowen v. Roy 3 4 should be applied.35 Five Jus-
tices had expressly rejected the less rigorous standard in Roy, how-
ever.36 In Hobbie, six Justices, including then newly appointed Justice
Scalia, joined in Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court reaffirming
the strict scrutiny approach.37
The high water mark for the protection of religious conduct under
the free exercise clause came a decade after Sherbert (and before
Thomas and Hobbie), when an effectively unanimous Court again em-
ployed the strict scrutiny approach in Wisconsin v. Yocer.38 Yoder
involved a challenge by Amish parents of high school age-children to
Wisconsin's compulsory school attendance statute. The Amish led a
distinctive lifestyle,3 9 and the parents believed that "by sending their
children to high school [beyond the eighth grade], they would not only
expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church commu-
nity, but... also endanger their own salvation and that of their chil-
34. 476 U.s. 693 (1986). Harking back to the Braunfeld Court's deferential treatment
of laws imposing only indirect burdens upon religious conduct, the Chief Justice
proposed a special approach for free exercise challenges to government benefits
programs: "the Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a chal-
lenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its appli-
cation, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest." I- at
707-08. Only Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined in that particular section of
the Chief Justice's opinion in Roy, however.
35. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 142 n.7 (1987).
36. Five members of the Court would have employed the strict scrutiny test to find a
free exercise violation on slightly different facts than the case presented. In Roy,
welfare administrators had assigned a social security number to a Native Ameri-
can girl despite her parents' belief that the social security number would harm
her spiritual development. If the government, rather than assigning the number
internally, were to require the parents to obtain and furnish a social security
number for her in order to apply for welfare benefits, these five justices would
have found that such a requirement did not pass the test of strict scrutiny.
Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 716 (1986)(Blackmun, J., concurring in part); 728-32
(O'Connor, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); 733 (White, J., dissenting).
37. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
38. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). Justice Douglas dissented in part, arguing that the majority
should not have assumed "that the only interests at stake in the case are those of
the Amish parents on the one hand, and those of the State on the other." I& at
241. Given the importance of education for any child's future, new hearings
should have been held in order to ensure that the religious views of the Amish
children were in accord with those asserted by their parents. Id- at 244-46. Jus-
tice Douglas agreed with the Court, however, regarding the protection of relig-
iously grounded actions under the free exercise clause. Id. at 247.
39. As the Court summarized the evidence, "Their rejection of telephones,
automobiles, radios, and television, their mode of dress, of speech, their habits of
manual work do indeed set them apart from much of contemporary society." Id-
at 217.
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dren."40 The Court sympathized, finding that enforcing the state's
compulsory attendance requirement would have a "severe" and "ines-
capable" impact upon Amish religious practice, an effect that "would
gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' reli-
gious beiefs."41
Wisconsin responded in a manner reminiscent of Reynolds,42 argu-
ing that religiously based actions fall outside the protection of the free
exercise clause, whereas religious beliefs receive absolute protection.
The Court's opinion by Chief Justice Burger, citing Sherbert and
Cantwell, declared that "in this context belief and action cannot be
neatly confined in logic-tight compartments." 43 The Court also re-
jected Wisconsin's argument that its requirement was permissible be-
cause it was religiously neutral and "motivated by legitimate secular
concerns."4 Relying on Sherbert, the Court declared, "A regulation
neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the con-
stitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly bur-
dens the free exercise of religion."45 The question was whether "the
State's broader contention that its interest in its system of compulsory
education is so compelling that even the established religious practices
of the Amish must give way."46
In respect to this view, Wisconsin first argued that its compulsory
education requirement served its interest in fostering intelligent par-
ticipation in the democratic process and in developing its citizens' abil-
ities to support themselves financially. In view of evidence that the
Amish had functioned as a successful and self-sufficient society for
over 200 years in the United States, however, the Court concluded that
requiring an additional one or two years of compulsory formal educa-
tion would produce "at best a speculative gain" in Amish abilities to
meet their civic and economic responsibilities.47
Second, Wisconsin asserted its interest as parens patriae in protect-
ing the right of Amish children to a secondary education. In response,
the Court acknowledged that a compulsory education requirement is
generally a reasonable means for the state to ensure access to educa-
tion for its citizens. Absent evidence "that parental decisions will
jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for
significant social burdens,"48 however, the state may not in so doing
40. Id- at 209.
41. Id at 218, 219.
42. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id- at 221.
47. Id. at 227.
48. Id. at 234. The Court had earlier found that the Amish custom of employing chil-
dren on the family farm presented no risk to their health and safety, and that the
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interfere with the "primary role of the parents in the upbringing of
their children," that of guiding "the religious future of the child."49
Thus, Yoder reaffirmed the Sherbert rule that a compelling state
interest is required to justify governmental restriction of religiously
motivated activity, even if the restriction takes the form of a relig-
iously neutral government regulation enacted for secular reasons. As
a result, religion attained a higher level of constitutional protection
"than almost anything else-including the freedoms of expression and
association, which we generally believe to be at the core of the demo-
cratic process."50
III. REJECTION OF SUBSEQUENT FREE EXERCISE CLAIMS
A. Government Interests in National Defense and Combatting Racial
Discrimination in Education
Despite the establishment of the Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny
standard, the Supreme Court has since rejected nearly all of the free
exercise claims it has considered.5 ' The results are more readily justi-
fied in some cases than in others. Two of the seemingly easier ones to
explain are Gillette v. United States52 and Bob Jones University v.
United States,53 in which the Court--either implicitly or explicitly-
recognized government interests important, substantial, or compelling
enough to justify burdens on religious liberty.
In Gillette, the Court considered arguments that the Selective Ser-
vice Act violated both the establishment clause and the free exercise
clause by exempting those opposed for religious reasons to "war in any
form," but not those opposed only to "unjust wars."5 4 The Court de-
voted most of its attention to the establishment clause, reasoning that
practice did not "present the undesirable economic aspects of eliminating jobs
that might otherwise be held by adults." Id. at 229.
49. Id. at 232.
50. Choper, The Free Exercise Clause: A Structural Overview and an Appraisal of
Recent Developments, 27 WaM. & MARY L. REV. 943, 945 (1986). To illustrate,
Sherbert and Yoder sustained free exercise challenges in the absence of any find-
ing that the government had intended to restrict religious liberty in enacting the
government regulations at issue. In contrast, in other areas of constitutional ad-
judication, the challenger must generally show government intent to burden the
constitutional interest asserted. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
Further, the free speech provision of the first amendment does not protect con-
duct unless the conduct is symbolic and the state has no independent reason (i.e.,
no reason unrelated to the suppression of free expression) to regulate that con-
duct. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989). See also Choper, supra note 6, at
585-86 (no analogy to ban on adjudicating truth or falsity of statements about
religious experiences).
51. See Choper, supra note 50, at 951-61.
52. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
53. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
54. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 441 (1971).
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"despite free exercise overtones," the former claim constituted "the
gist of the constitutional complaint."55 The establishment clause argu-
ment was that the Selective Service Act's draft exemption "impermis-
sibly discriminat[ed] among types of religious belief and affiliation."56
In holding that the draft exemption withstood the establishment
clause challenge, the Court merely required a "valid secular reason"
for the law: ease of administration of the draft system.57
When it turned to the free exercise claim, the Court did not ex-
pressly employ the strict scrutiny standard. Instead, the Court simply
held that the secular reasons advanced to meet the establishment
clause challenge also constituted "governmental interests of a kind
and weight sufficient to justify under the Free Exercise Clause the
impact of the conscription laws on those who object to particular
wars."5 8 But for the Court to find that administrative convenience
qualifies as a "compelling" government interest would be at odds with
the strict scrutiny approach.5 9
In my view, the best explanation for the result in Gillette is that
the Court concluded that the Selective Service Act survived some
form of heightened scrutiny.60 Even after finding that the govern-
ment's interest in administrative convenience sufficed to meet the free
exercise challenge, the Court went on to observe: "And more broadly,
of course, there is the Government's interest in procuring the man-
power necessary for military purposes, pursuant to the constitutional
grant of power to Congress to raise and support armies."61 This sug-
gests that for the Court the combination of the powerful government
interest in military preparedness and the difficulties in administering
a draft exemption based on "just war" beliefs together justified the
conclusion that the statutory discrimination among religious beliefs
was based on a compelling, or substantial, or overriding government
interest.
55. Id at 449. The de-emphasis of the free exercise claim is significant because,
under the establishment clause, the Court has applied a much more lenient test
to laws that expressly deal with religion and have an effect that subjects some
faiths to discriminatory treatment, than the strict scrutiny test it has applied
under the free exercise clause to general, neutral laws that have an effect that
conflicts with religious beliefs. Choper, supra note 50, at 960.
56. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971).
57. Id. at 454-60.
58. Id at 461.
59. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 408-09 (1963)(administrative ease not a
strong state interest unless granting an exemption would cause "an administra-
tive problem of such magnitude... that such a requirement would have rendered
the entire statutory scheme unworkable.") See also Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
198 (1976)(administrative ease and convenience insufficient state interest even
under intermediate scrutiny).
60. See Choper, supra note 50, at 960-61.
61. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971).
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By contrast, in Bob Jones University, the Court explicitly em-
ployed the free exercise clause's strict scrutiny test, holding-without
dissent on this point-that the government's "fundamental, overriding
interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education" was "com-
pelling," and that "no 'less restrictive means' ... [were] available to
achieve the governmental interest."62 The Court rejected the free ex-
ercise claim by ruling that the government's interest "substantially
outweighs" the burden imposed by the Internal Revenue Service's de-
nial of tax-exempt status to two private schools engaging in racial dis-
crimination on the basis of their sincerely held religious beliefs.63
Thus, the Court had identified two types of government interests
substantial enough to survive free exercise clause challenges: national
defense and the national policy against racial discrimination in educa-
tion, even though whether these government interests are "compel-
ling" in the strict sense of the word has been persuasively
challenged.64
B. Special Contexts: Military and Prison Affairs
Two other cases in which the Court rejected free exercise claims
can be explained because of their special contexts. The first, Goldman
v. Weinberger,65 arose in the area of military affairs. An Orthodox
Jewish Air Force psychologist contended that the Air Force's efforts
to prevent him from wearing his yarmulke on duty in a military hospi-
tal under a regulation which barred the wearing of headgear indoors
infringed upon his first amendment freedom to exercise his religious
62. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983). Justice Rehnquist,
dissenting on grounds of statutory interpretation, agreed "that there is a strong
national policy in this country opposed to racial discrimination," and "that Con-
gress has the power to further this policy by denying § 501(c)(3) status to organi-
zations that practice racial discrimination." Id. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. MeL at 604.
64. For criticism of the Court's labelling of these government interest as "compel-
ling," see Greenawalt, All or Nothing at Alk The Defeat of Selective Conscien-
tious Objection, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 31, 76 (in Gillette, government did not
demonstrate "compelling," as opposed to "substantial," interest "since there was
no demonstration that conscription itself would be seriously impaired by an ex-
tended exemption"); Freed & Polsby, Race, Religion, and Public Policy: Bob
Jones University v. United States, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 22-24 & n.55 (refusal in
Yoder to defer to government interest in universal compulsory education cannot
be reconciled with recognition in Bob Jones of a compelling government interest
in eliminating racial discrimination in education)[hereinafter Race, Religion, and
Public Policy]; Laycock, Tax Exemptions for Racially Discriminatory Religious
Schools, 60 TEx. L. REv. 259, 275 (1982) (national policy of fostering racial equality
involved in Bob Jones "too attenuated to justify interference" with internal af-
fairs of pervasively religious schools unless religious schools "so take over the
public function of educating white students that desegregated education outside
those church schools become impossible").
65. 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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beliefs. The Court, reasoning that "the military is, by necessity, a spe-
cialized society separate from civilian society" because it "must insist
upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian
life,"66 refused to apply the Sherbert-Yoder strict scrutiny standard.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for a 5-4.majority, declared that although
first amendment guarantees are not rendered "entirely nugatory in
the military context," the standard is nevertheless highly deferen-
tial.6 7 Thus, if "[t]he considered professional judgment of the Air
Force is that the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized
uniforms" increases military effectiveness, the free exercise clause
does not require the military to accommodate religious practices such
as the wearing of the yarmulke. 68 The free exercise clause requires
only that "the regulations challenged here reasonably and evenhand-
edly regulate dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for
uniformity."69
Second, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz 7o involved a prison policy that
prevented prisoners with outside work assignments from returning to
the prison during the day except in the case of emergency. The policy,
designed to minimize the security risk of traffic at the main gate, had
the effect of preventing the Muslim prisoners from attending
Jumu'ah, a weekly service held in the early afternoon on Fridays. The
Court's analysis in the prison context was much the same as in the
area of military affairs. While "convicted prisoners do not forfeit all
constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confine-
ment in prison," nevertheless, "[l]awful incarceration brings about the
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a
retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal sys-
tem."71 Therefore, "when a prison regulation impinges upon inmates'
constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related
to legitimate penological interests."7 2 By another 5-4 vote, the Court
upheld the policy.73
66. Id. at 506-07.
67. "In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether military needs jus-
tify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give
great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning
the relative importance of a particular military interest." Id. at 507.
68. Id. at 508-09.
69. Id. at 510.
70. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
71. Id at 348.
72. Id. at 349.
73. The Court has employed the same deferential policies in free speech cases arising
in the military and prison contexts. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828
(1976)(military); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)(military); Procunier v. Mar-
tinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974)(prison).
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C. Compelling Government Interest in an Exemption-Free Tax System
It is probably hardest to justify the outcome in United States v.
Lee.74 An Old Order Amish farmer and carpenter, the employer of
several other Amish, refused to pay the employer's share of the social
security tax on his employees' wages. He based his refusal on the
Amish belief that it is sinful not to provide for financially dependent
members of the community. 75 As a consequence of this belief, the
Amish oppose both payment of social security taxes and receipt of so-
cial security benefits. The employer claimed that imposition of the
social security taxes violated his free exercise rights and those of his
Amish employees.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court applied the following
version of the strict scrutiny standard: "The state may justify a limita-
tion on religious liberty by showing that it is essential to accomplish an
overriding governmental interest."76 The Court found the govern-
ment's interest in "assuring mandatory and continuous participation
in and contribution to the social security system" to be "very high."77
In support of its conclusion, the Court briefly referred to statements
from congressional reports that the institution of a voluntary social
security system would threaten its fiscal well-being.7 8 The Court then
considered whether "accommodating the Amish belief will unduly in-
terfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest."79 Because of
the administrative difficulties of maintaining a "comprehensive social
security system, which rests on a complex of actuarial factors," and
because "we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost
every conceivable religious preference," the Court unanimously up-
held the government's position.80
The result in Lee is difficult to square with the standard of strict
scrutiny.8 ' The Court's finding of an overriding government interest
in a compulsory social security system may be generally acceptable,
but not in circumstances such as these, where non-participants would
also be non-recipients who would very likely be able to sustain them-
selves during retirement. As Justice Stevens persuasively contends in
his separate concurrence, an exemption for Amish employers "proba-
bly would benefit the social security system because the nonpayment
of these taxes by the Amish would be more than offset by the elimina-
74. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
75. The Amnish belief was based upon a literal interpretation of I Timothy 5:8: 'But if
any provide not.., for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith, and is
worse than an infidel." Id at 255 n.3.
76. Id. at 257-58.
77. Id- at 258-59.
78. Id. at 258.
79. Id. at 259.
80. Id-
81. See also Choper, supra note 50, at 952-53.
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tion of their right to collect benefits."8 2 Nor is the only available alter-
native to mandatory participation a complete transformation to a
voluntary system, which the Court implied by considering the effects
of such a conversion.8 3 Rather, the free exercise claim could have
been fully satisfied simply by extending to Amish employers the same
exemption that Congress had already granted self-employed Amish
and other religious persons.8 4
The Court also reasoned that there is no principled way to distin-
guish the exemption desired in Lee from other instances in which indi-
viduals seek tax exemptions on religious grounds, e.g., an individual
religiously opposed to paying income taxes as long as a portion of the
federal budget is devoted to defense expenditures "would have a simi-
larly valid claim."85 Such persons would affect the income tax system
quite differently, however, than would Amish employers affect the so-
cial security system. There would be a net loss to the income tax sys-
tem if exemptions were granted to defense tax objectors, but since the
Amish not only refuse to pay in but also decline to take out, nothing
indicates that the social security system would suffer any net diminu-
tion in revenue.8 6 Accordingly, even though the government may
have a compelling interest in mandatory participation in the income
tax system, no such compelling interest was present in Lee.
Instead, it is Yoder, not the hypothetical defense-spending-objector
cases, that is difficult to distinguish from Lee. If the government in-
terest in compulsory education in Yoder was not compelling because
Amish practices constituted an adequate substitute, there would seem
to be no reason in Lee that the government interest should not be dis-
counted for the same reason. The Court attempted to distinguish
Yoder by commenting that "it would be difficult to accommodate the
comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing
from a wide variety of religious beliefs."87 But it seems likely that
parents of a wide range of religious beliefs could create an equally sig-
nificant problem by demanding exemptions for their children from
compulsory public education systems.88 Moreover, the Court's ac-
82. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 262 (1982)(Stevens, J., concurring).
83. Id at 258 (" '[W]idespread individual voluntary coverage under social security...
would undermine the soundness of the social security program.' (quoting a Sen-
ate report). Moreover, a comprehensive national social security system providing
for voluntary participation would be almost a contradiction in terms and difficult,
if not impossible, to administer.").
84. 1& at 262 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens added: "The Court's analysis
supports a holding that there is virtually no room for a 'constitutionally required
exemption' on religious grounds from a valid tax law that is entirely neutral in its
general application." I& at 263 (Stevens, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 260.
86. See supra text accompanying note 82.
87. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 259-60 (1982).
88. See Freed & Polsby, supra note 64, at 24 n.55.
[Vol. 70:651
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
knowledgement of a compelling government interest in sound tax sys-
tems is very difficult to reconcile with Sherbert and its progeny, which
played such a significant role in establishing the free exercise doctrine
of strict scrutiny, in which the Court refused to grant "compelling"
status to state interests in fiscally sound unemployment compensation
systems.8 9
The highly questionable result in Lee may be seen as a sign of the
Justices' discomfort with their free exercise doctrine's provision of a
special exemption from ordinary government regulations. Appar-
ently, the Court decided to draw the line at taxes, as it did in protect-
ing government interests in national defense and the national policy
against racial discrimination in education, even though this position is
quite difficult to justify under the Sherbert-Yoder doctrine.
The Court recently followed Lee's recognition of a compelling gov-
ernment interest in an exemption-free tax system in Hernandez v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.9 0 Hernandez involved members
of the Church of Scientology who sought to deduct "fixed donations"
paid to the Church for pastoral counseling sessions (called "auditing"
or "training" sessions) on their federal income tax returns as charita-
ble contributions. According to Church doctrine, the sessions were a
necessary means of studying the tenets of Scientology and of increas-
ing spiritual awareness.91 In addition, the proceeds generated were
the Church's primary source of income.92 The Internal Revenue Ser-
vice disallowed the deductions. The Supreme Court upheld the
I.R.S.'s determination that the counseling fees were not "charitable
contributions." Rather, the payments were "part of a quintessential
quid pro quo exchange: in return for their money, petitioners re-
ceived an identifiable benefit, namely, auditing and training
sessions."93
The Scientologists argued that this violated their free exercise
right by "plac[ing] a heavy burden on the central practice of
Scientology." 94 In response, the Court first indicated its doubts as to
the substantiality of the burden that the denial of an income tax de-
duction placed on the claimants. In contrast to the Amish employer in
Lee, "[n]either the payment nor the receipt of taxes is forbidden by the
Scientology faith generally, and Scientology does not proscribe the
payment of taxes in connection with auditing or training sessions spe-
cifically." 95 Instead, the only burden imposed on the claimants' reli-
89. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bc, Ind. Em-
ployment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718-19 (1981).
90. 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
91. Id. at 684-85.
92. Id- at 685.
93. Id. at 691.
94. Id- at 698.
95. I& at 699.
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gious conduct was that "as a result of the deduction denial, adherents
have less money available to gain access to such sessions."96 Even as-
suming the tax deduction denial was substantial enough to trigger ap-
plication of strict scrutiny, however, on the basis of Lee "a substantial
burden would be justified by the 'broad public interest in maintaining
a sound tax system,' free of 'myriad exceptions flowing from a wide
variety of religious beliefs.' "97
The Court's consistent pattern of rejecting free exercise claims in
the tax context continued with its unanimous decision in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization.98 Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries (JSM) contended that California's imposition of sales and
use taxes upon its sale of religious materials at meetings and by mail
violated the free exercise clause. JSM relied heavily upon earlier deci-
sions that had invalidated flat license taxes imposed as a precondition
to the sale of religious materials,99 but the Court distinguished them
as follows:
[U]nlike the license tax in Murdock, which was 'in no way apportioned' to the
'realized revenues' of the itinerant preachers forced to pay the tax (citations),
... [California's tax] is akin to a generally applicable income or property tax,
which Murdock and Follett specifically state may constitutionally be imposed
on religious activity. 1 0 0
In fact, the Court's holding a year earlier in Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock 10 1 had already undermined the vitality of both Murdock and
Follett. In Texas Monthly, the Court held that a sales tax exemption
for religious periodicals violated the establishment clause as "state
sponsorship of religious belief."102 Texas Monthly made it clear that
"[t]o the extent that our opinions in Murdock and Follett might be
96. Id.
97. 1d. at 699-700 (quoting Lee). Justice Scalia joined in Justice O'Connor's dissent,
challenging the Hernandez Court's result as a violation of the establishment
clause. The dissenters reasoned that, by allowing adherents of other faiths to
deduct quid pro quo payments similar to those of the Scientologists, the govern-
ment had put its "imprimatur on [all but] one religion." Id. at 712 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971)). Just nine
months before Smith, Justice Scalia did not register any criticism of the Court's
free exercise doctrine. In addition, only 14 months before Smith, Justice Scalia
had stated-again in the establishment clause context-that "the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment required religious beliefs to be accommodated by
granting religion-specific exemptions from otherwise applicable laws." Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 38 (1989)(Scalia, J., dissenting)(emphasis in
original). See McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57
U. CH. L. REV. 1109, 1121 (1990).
98. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
99. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) and Follett v. Town of McCor-
mick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating flat license taxes found to operate as a prior
restraint on the exercise of religious liberty).
100. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 390 (1990).
101. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
102. Id. at 15.
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read... to suggest that the States and the Federal Government may
never tax the sale of religious or other publications, we reject those
dicta."103
After distinguishing the greatly weakened precedents of Murdock
and Follett, the JSM opinion turned to the strict scrutiny test: "[The
free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substan-
tial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice
and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the
burden."1 04 The Court never reached the issue of the status of Cali-
fornia's interest in the soundness of its tax system, however, because it
found that the state's generally applicable sales and use tax did not
impose a burden substantial enough to trigger the application of strict
scrutiny.
As in Hernandez and in contrast to Lee, 0 5 JSM's tenets did not
prohibit the payment of the tax.106 Moreover, the tax was imposed
upon the purchasers of the materials; the seller was only required to
collect and remit the tax.107 Therefore, "the only burden on [JSM] is
the claimed reduction in income resulting from the presumably lower
demand for [JSM's] wares (caused by the marginally higher price) and
from the costs associated with administering the tax."10s In such a
case, the Court concluded (following Hernandez) that "to the extent
that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the
amount of money [JSM] has to spend on its religious activities, any
such burden is not constitutionally significant."10 9
The result in JSM (as in Hernandez) is in tension with Sherbert. In
both cases the claimants incurred financial costs in the course of en-
gaging in activity pursuant to their religious beliefs. In both cases, the
claimants sought special governmental accommodation in order to be
relieved of the costs attached to their religiously motivated activity.
Indeed, in JSM (and Hernandez) the financial costs restricted the di-
rect flow of funds to the church, yet the Court made no
accommodation.
The JSM Court distinguished Sherbert and its progeny by contrast-
ing the role of JSM's religious beliefs with the role religious belief had
played in the unemployment compensation context:
[B]ecause... [JSM's] religious beliefs do not forbid payment of the sales and
use tax, . . . in no sense has the State "condition[ed] receipt of an important
103. Id. at 24.
104. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 384-85
(1990)(quoting Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699
(1989)).
105. See supra text accompanying note 95.
106. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).
107. Id.
108. I&
109. I&
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benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or . .. denie[d] such a
benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting sub-
stantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his
beliefs."1 1 o
The Court's distinction is based upon a characterization of the rela-
tionship between religious belief and government regulation, how-
ever, that is more rhetorical than real. The situation in Sherbert could
have been similarly described, for Mrs. Sherbert's beliefs did not "for-
bid" her from relinquishing unemployment compensation. It is true,
though, that the degree of economic disadvantage was greater for Mrs.
Sherbert than for JSM (but perhaps not for the Church of Scientology
in Hernandez). In any case, the Court deemed the financial cost levied
upon JSM's religious activity not to be "constitutionally significant"
under the free exercise clause, an inquiry never made in Sherbert.'l'
Although the Court might weigh in the balance the scope of a
given burden and the resulting pressure it places on activities man-
dated or forbidden by religious doctrine, free exercise protection
should probably not hinge upon that factor. Judicial inquiry into such
matters as how important a specific religious tenet is for a believer or
how heavily the government imposed burden affects a particular indi-
vidual's adherence to his religious precepts places the courts in an un-
desirably intrusive posture. Moreover, a subsequent balancing of
these considerations against the strength of the government interest
involves a weighing of incommensurables that creates serious
problems of judicial prerogative in constitutional adjudication. Thus,
subject to the limitations set forth below,112 the better focus should be
on the substantiality of the government interest in regulating the
activity.
D. A Structural Distinction Limiting the Scope of the Free Exercise
Clause
Finally, in rejecting a free exercise claim in Lyng v. Northwest In-
110. Id. at 391-92 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136,
141 (1987)).
111. Id. at 391.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 217-21. For example, if granting an exemption
would violate the establishment clause by coercing, compromising, or influencing
religious belief, the exemption should not be granted. In my view, Sherbert was
wrongly decided for that reason. Choper, The Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment" Reconciling the Conflict, 41 U. PIrr. L. REV. 673, 691 (1980)(Sher-
bert exemption violates establishment clause because the sole purpose of the ex-
emption was to aid religion and compulsorily raised tax funds would be used to
subsidize that aid); Choper, supra note 50, at 950 n.25 (exempting religious activ-
ity from state unemployment compensation laws violates establishment clause by
using compulsory tax funds for religious purposes). Similarly, exempting reli-
gious activity from state tax laws violates the establishment clause by increasing
the tax burden upon others. Thus, in my view, Swaggart was correctly decided.
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dian Cemetery Protective Association,"13 the Court devised a struc-
tural distinction between, on the one hand, the "incidental effects" of
the government's conduct of its own internal affairs and, on the other
hand, the government "penalizing" or "coercing" religiously moti-
vated conduct (by making it criminal) or inducing an individual to en-
gage or refrain from engaging in religiously motivated conduct
(through denial of civil benefits). In Lyng, American Indians sought
to prevent the United States Forest Service from building a road
through a section of a national forest that had historically been used
for religious purposes because completion of the road would "virtually
destroy the... Indians' ability to practice their religion."114
The Court declined to apply strict scrutiny, invoking its ruling in
Bowen v. Roy that the free exercise clause "simply cannot be under-
stood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in
ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens."" 5
Even though "indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of
religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under
the First Amendment,"" 6 a different approach is required for judicial
inquiry into government conduct of internal procedures:
[I]ncidental effects of government programs, which may make it more diffi-
cult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individ-
uals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs . . . [nor to] penalize
religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits,
and privileges enjoyed by other citizes .... [cannot] require government to
bring forward a compelling justification for its otherwise lawful actions.1 1 7
Because of the remedy that the challengers were seeking, Lyng dif-
fered structurally in an additional way from all of the cases in which
the Court had accepted a free exercise claim. In Yoder and in the un-
employment compensation cases (as well as in the five justice dictum
in Bowen v. Roy),"l8 the challengers simply sought exemptions for
themselves, requiring the government to make limited accommoda-
tions in the pursuit of its objectives. In Lyng, by contrast, the chal-
lengers sought to have the government abandon altogether the road
113. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
114. Id at 451 (quoting the finding of the Ninth Circuit below in Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688, 693 (1986)).
115. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 448
(1988)(quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986)(government assignment
and internal use of social security number for a two year-old girl did not violate
free exercise rights of parents who believed that obtaining a social security
number for their daughter would adversely affect her spiritual well-being)). The
Court's holding in Roy was limited to the situation in which the government, in
conducting its internal affairs, did not also require applicants to engage in con-
duct that violated their religious beliefs. See supra note 36.
116. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
117. Id. at 449-51.
118. See supra notes 36 and 115.
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that it intended to build.119 The Court has granted remedies that
would force the government to abandon an entire program only when
the government's objective was religious in nature, as in the school
prayer cases.1 20 Although the matter is not uncomplicated,121 there is
much to be said for the Court's view that, rather than weighing the
effect on the government's interest of granting an exemption for a
given free exercise claim in the balance, those claims seeking a rem-
edy that would require the government to abandon its program en-
tirely should be structurally distinguished and the free exercise
exemption ordinarily denied.
IV. EVALUATING SMITH
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,122 two drug rehabilitation counselors were fired from their
jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization when, after agree-
ing as a condition of employment not to use illegal drugs,123 they in-
gested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native
American Church. In Oregon, the possession of peyote, a controlled
substance, was a felony. When the drug counselors applied for state
unemployment compensation, the agency held them to be ineligible
under a state rule that disqualifies employees discharged for work-re-
lated "misconduct."12 4 The drug counselors appealed, relying on Sher-
bert, Thomas and Hobbie for the proposition that a state "cannot
condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an individ-
119. Since the Forest Service had considered "at least two [other routes for the pro-
posed roadway] that circumnavigated the high country altogether," Lyng v.
Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 462 (1988)(Brennan,
J., dissenting), at the very least the government would have had to build the road
over different route, if not abandon the plan altogether.
120. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
121. For example, one might well question the degree of difference between the rem-
edy of requiring the government to build a road a few miles away from its pre-
ferred site and requiring the government to exempt certain individuals from a
general government program like the draft. See Williams & Williams, Volitional-
ism and Religious Liberty, 76 CoRNELL L. REV. 769, 906-910 (1991).
122. 485 U.S. 660 (1988)(Smith 1); Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595 (1990)(Smith H1).
123. The drug rehabilitation organization's policy statement on drug and alcohol abuse
provided, in pertinent part:
In keeping with our drug-free philosophy of treatment, and our belief in
the disease concept of alcoholism, and associated complex issues involved
in both alcoholism and drug addiction, we require the following of our
employees:
1. Use of an illegal drug or use of prescription drugs in a nonprescribed
manner is grounds for immediate termination from employment....
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 662 n.3
(1988).
124. Employment Div., Dep't Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1598 (1990).
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ual's unwillingness to forgo conduct required by his religion." 25 Fol-
lowing an intermediate state appellate court's reversal of the Board's
decision,126 the Oregon Supreme Court first held that the denial of
unemployment benefits did not violate the religion provisions of the
Oregon Constitution because the employer-rather than the state-
was responsible for the imposition on religious freedom.12 7 The Ore-
gon Supreme Court then ruled in favor of the drug counselors, how-
ever, on federal free exercise grounds. 2 8
The first time the case came before the United States Supreme
Court, the dispute was framed in terms of two issues: (1) whether the
sacramental use of peyote is a criminal offense in Oregon, and (2)
whether prohibition of such religiously motivated conduct violates the
free exercise clause, for if it does not then "it certainly follows that
[Oregon] may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment
compensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct."'2 9 The
Court reasoned that in Sherbert, Thomas and Hobbie "the conduct that
gave rise to the termination of employment was perfectly legal,...
[but t]he results... might well have been different if the employees
had been discharged for engaging in criminal conduct." 130 In support
125. I&
126. The cases of the two dismissed drug counselors, Alfred Smith and Galen Black,
which raised identical legal issues and presented almost identical facts, proceeded
in tandem through state administrative proceedings and through the state courts.
In Black, an Oregon appellate court reversed the decision of the Employment
Appeals Board, concluding that the denial of benefits to a person discharged for
engaging in a religious act constituted a substantial burden on free exercise rights
that was not justified by the state's interest in protecting its unemployment fund
from depletion. Black v. Employment Div., 707 P.2d 1274 (Or. Ct. App. 1985). In
Smith, the appellate court reversed the Board's decision and remanded for fur-
ther consideration in light of Black. Smith v. Employment Div., 709 P.2d 246 (Or.
Ct. App. 1985).
127. "If claimant's freedom to worship has been interfered with, that interference was
committed by his employer, not by the unemployment statutes." Smith v. Em-
ployment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 216, 721 P.2d 445, 448
(1986). See also Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or.
221, 224-25, 721 P.2d 451, 453 (1986). "An employer may impose conditions on
employment that conflict with the employee's particular religious practices or
beliefs. If the employe violates the conditions imposed, the employe is not eligi-
ble for benefits when the violation is 'a wilful violation of the standards of behav-
ior which an employer has the right to expect of an employe."' Smith v.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 721 P.2d 445, 448
(1986)(quoting Oregon's statutory definition of work-related "misconduct").
128. Black v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 221, 721 P.2d 451
(1986); Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 721
P.2d 445 (1986). The United States Supreme Court consolidated the two cases
when it granted Oregon's petition for certiorari. 480 U.S. 916 (1987). For further
procedural details, see Smith v. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources,
485 U.S. at 661-67 (1988).
129. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988).
130. Id
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of its reasoning, the Court pointed out:
We have held that bigamy may be forbidden, even when the practice is dic-
tated by sincere religious convictions. If a bigamist may be sent to jail despite
the religious motivation for his misconduct, surely a State may refuse to pay
unemployment compensation to a marriage counselor who was discharged be-
cause he or she entered into a bigamous relationship. The protection that the
First Amendment provides to "legitimate claims to the free exercise of reli-
gion"... does not extend to conduct that a State has validly proscribed.1 3 1
Accordingly, the Court vacated the decisions of the Oregon Supreme
Court for determination of the first question. 32
The Oregon Supreme Court held that the drug counselors' relig-
iously inspired use of peyote fell under the prohibition of the Oregon
criminal statute because peyote was listed as a controlled substance
and the statute provided for no exception for sacramental use.133 The
Oregon Supreme Court also held, however, that enforcement of statu-
tory prohibitions of possession or use of peyote against those using it
for sacramental purposes would violate the first amendment.134
The second time the United States Supreme Court addressed
Smith, it held, "Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause,
deny [the drug counselors'] unemployment compensation when their
dismissal results from use of the drug."135 Justice Scalia (writing for a
majority of five) concluded that state prohibition of the religious use
of peyote is permissible under the free exercise clause,136 expressly
declining to apply the traditional strict scrutiny test: "[T]he sounder
approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our
precedents, is to hold the [strict scrutiny] test inapplicable to... chal-
lenges [to] across-the-board criminal prohibitions on a particular form
of conduct."'137  I
Because of the peculiar facts of the case, I agree with the Court's
result. It is important to emphasize that the case did not involve a
criminal prosecution for the sacramental use of peyote. Nor did it in-
volve a denial of unemployment benefits for a firing that was caused
by an employer's change in the terms of employment after hiring an
employee; 38 nor even an employee's change of religious views after
131. Id at 671 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)(citations omit-
ted) (emphasis in Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S.
660 (1988)).
132. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 674 (1988).
133. Smith v. Employment Div., 307 Or. 68, 72-73, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988).
134. Yd. at 76, 763 P.2d at 150.
135. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1606
(1990).
136. Id at 1599.
137. I& at 1603.
138. As was the case in Sherbert, supra text accompanying note 22, and Thomas, supra
text accompanying note 30.
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beginning employment. 39 All of these instances may pose difficult
questions under the free exercise clause. In Smith, however, the de-
nial of benefits should have been upheld on the ground that the em-
ployees were estopped from making an "end run" on the
unemployment compensation system-making a promise to the em-
ployer concerning its powerful interest in drug counselors abstaining
from the use of drugs, breaking that promise, and then seeking to ob-
tain benefits.14 0
I do not, however, agree with the Court's reasoning. In view of the
Court's recent history of rejecting most free exercise claims, the
Court's conclusion was not surprising. But the outcome was not en-
tirely predictable, either. As strongly argued in Justice Blackmun's
dissent, it was doubtful that the state had a compelling interest in not
granting an exemption.' 41 In any event, the Court's much broader ra-
tionale that the free exercise clause does not mandate any exemptions
for religious conduct that conflicts with generally applicable govern-
ment regulations was very surprising and wholly unexpected, espe-
cially in light of the fact that Justice Scalia had recently joined in the
Court's strong reaffirmation of the compelling state interest standard
in Hobbie,142 rejecting a less rigorous standard originally proposed in
139. As in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Conm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 138 (1987)(after
two and one-half years of employment, the claimant joined the Seventh-day Ad-
ventist Church and refused to work on her Sabbath, from sundown on Friday to
sundown on Saturday).
140. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the denial of benefits did not violate the
Oregon Constitution on this basis. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
141. Justice Blackmun rejected each of the three interests that Oregon advanced as
"compelling." First, regarding the state's proclaimed interest "in protecting the
health and safety of its citizens from the dangers of unlawful drugs," Justice
Blackmun responded:
The carefully circumscribed ritual context in which respondents used
peyote is far removed from the irresponsible and unrestricted recrea-
tional use of unlawful drugs. The Native American Church's internal
restrictions on, and supervision of, its members' use of peyote substan-
tially obviate the State's health and safety concerns.
Unemployment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1618
(1990)(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice Blackmun found it signifi-
cant that the federal government and the twenty-three states which exempt the
religious use of peyote from their drug laws "all find their (presumably compel-
ling) interests in controlling the use of dangerous drugs compatible with an ex-
emption for religious use of peyote." Id at 1618 n. 5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Second, with respect to the state's "interest in abolishing drug trafficking," Jus-
tice Blackmun points out that "[tihere is... practically no illegal traffic in pe-
yote." Id. at 1620 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Finally, turning to the state's
"interest in the uniform, fair, and certain enforcement of its drug laws," Justice
Blackmun maintains-that this argument "could be made in almost any free exer-
cise case. (citation omitted). This Court, however, consistently has rejected simi-
lar arguments in past free exercise cases, and it should do so here as well." Id-
(citations omitted).
142. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987).
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Bowen v. Roy by Chief Justice Burger, who was joined only by Justices
Powell and Rehnquist.143
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court is quite straightforward in
addressing the relevant issues. After acknowledging that the compel-
ling state interest standard was the prevailing approach,144 Justice
Scalia argues that "[i]n recent years we have abstained from applying
the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at
all."145 He then fairly describes how the test has been watered down
in past judicial applications: "Although we have sometimes purported
to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than ... [the area of unem-
ployment compensation], we have always found the test satisfied."'146
Justice Scalia is less persuasive, however, in suggesting that the un-
employment compensation cases can be distinguished on the ground
that they arose "in a context that lent itself to individualized govern-
mental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct."147 Argu-
ing that "a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation
programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the
particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment,"148
Justice Scalia declares: "[O]ur decisions in the unemployment cases
stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of
individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to
cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."149
"Individualized" exemptions and the opportunity for consideration
of particular circumstances exist, however, for a great many types of
143. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707-08 (1986). Justices White and Stevens, who joined
Justice Scalia's opinion in Smith, had also reaffirmed the strict scrutiny standard
in Hobbie. Justice White, like Justice Scalia, joined the Hobbie majority's posi-
tion. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1987).
Justice Stevens' rationale for applying the standard, however, would have re-
stricted its scope considerably. IMi at 147-48 (Stevens, J., concurring)(strict scru-
tiny applies when the state, in administering benefits, treats religious claims for
exemptions less favorably than other claims for exemptions).
144. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602
(1990).
145. Md Justice Scalia may be said to have somewhat overstated his point. He por-
trays Bowen v. Roy as a case in which the Court "declined to apply Sherbert anal-
ysis ... [and] held the statute's application to the plaintiffs valid regardless of
whether it was necessary to effectuate a compelling interest." Id But a majority
of the Court in that case expressly called for the application of strict scrutiny and
would have found a free exercise violation if the government, in administering
welfare benefits, required applicants to obtain a social security number in viola-
tion of their religious beliefs. See supra note 36.
146. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602
(1990)(citing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982), and Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971)).
147. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1603
(1990).
148. Id-
149. Id.
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regulations.1S0 Further, "most of the Supreme Court's free exercise
cases resemble the unemployment compensation cases in that they in-
volve individuated governmental assessments of the claimant's cir-
cumstances." 151 To illustrate, the Oregon statute involved in Smith
prohibited possession of a "controlled substance" unless prescribed by
a medical practitioner,15 2 the Selective Service Act in Gillette ex-
empted various groups including those opposed to "war in any
form,"1 5 3 and the Sunday closing law in Braunfeld applied only to re-
tail merchants selling specifically listed items.54 Thus, as Professor
Michael McConnell concludes: "The unemployment cases cannot be
distinguished on this ground."SS
Justice Scalia disposed of the non-unemployment compensation
precedents by contending that: "[Ihe only decisions in which we
have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral,
generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved
not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections."156 This assertion
does hold true for many free speech/free exercise cases, such as
Cantwel 1L57 and Barnette.158 Yoder,15 9 however, cannot legitimately
be described as involving a "hybrid" claim. Justice Scalia argues that
the additional constitutional protection involved in Yoder was "the
right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society ofSisters,16o... to
direct the education of their children." 161 But Yoder "expressly stated
that parents do not have the right to violate the compulsory education
laws for nonreligious reasons."1 62 Moreover, attributing the result in
150. See Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 S. CT. REV. 1, 50 ("American
statutes are riddled with exceptions and exemptions for various special interests,
small businesses, private citizens, and government agencies.").
151. McConnell, supra note 97, at 1123 (citing as examples United States. v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 260 (1964); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 442 (1988) and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 346 (1987)).
152. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602
(1990).
153. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 442 n.5 (1971).
154. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 601 n.1 (1961).
155. McConnell, supra note 97, at 1124.
156. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601
(1990).
157. Cartwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); see supra text accompanying note 2.
158. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); see supra text
accompanying notes 3-5.
159. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
160. 268 U.S. 510 (1924).
161. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1601
(1990).
162. McConnell, supra note 97, at 1121 (referring to Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205,
215-16 (1972)). "Thus, according to Yoder parents have no right independent of
the Free Exercise Clause to withhold their children from school .. ". Id. By
contrast, it is clear that in decisions such as Cantwell and Barnette there was a
1991]
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Yoder to its combination of free exercise rights with a substantive due
process right 6 3 of parents to direct their children's education is espe-
cially ironic for Justice Scalia, who rejects use of the due process
clause "to invent new [constitutionally protected substantive inter-
ests]," especially-as in the case of compulsory education laws-when
there is "a societal tradition of enacting laws denying the interest."'164
Justice Scalia's contention that free exercise claims have been ac-
cepted only in "hybrid situations"' 65-situations involving a free exer-
cise interest in combination with another constitutional right-also
overlooks Bowen v. Roy where, without referring to any other consti-
tutionally protected interest in support of their conclusion, five Jus-
tices found that requiring welfare applicants to violate their religious
beliefs by obtaining and furnishing a social security number would not
pass the test of strict scrutiny under the free exercise clause.' 66
Finally, Justice Scalia contends that the application of the "com-
pelling government interest" test has only very limited application in
other fields: the Court subjects "to the most exacting scrutiny laws
that make classifications based on race or on the content of speech," 67
but not "race-neutral laws that have the effect of disproportionately
disadvantaging a particular racial group .. . [or] generally applicable
laws unconcerned with regulating speech that have the effect of inter-
fering with speech." 68 Justice Scalia cautions that a broader applica-
tion of strict scrutiny than is common in other fields-to "generally
applicable, religion-neutral laws that have the effect of burdening a
particular religious practice"-would necessarily lead to one of two
undesirable results. First, the test could end up being diluted: "water-
ing it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is
applied."169 Alternatively, if the test were to be "applied across the
freedom of speech right independent of the free exercise of religion right. See
supra text accompanying note 6.
163. Pierce explicitly acknowledged that its holding comes "[u]nder the doctrine of
Meyer v. Nebraska," which was based on the substantive scope of the fourteenth
amendment's due process guarantee. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534
(1925). See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
164. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122 n.2 (1989)(emphasis in origi-
nal)(rejecting natural father's substantive due process claim to parental rights
over a child born into a woman's existing marriage with another man).
165. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1602
(1990).
166. See supra note 36.
167. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 n.3
(citations omitted).
168. Id (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).
169. Id, at 1605. The feared "watering down" of the compelling government interest
test, however, has already occurred. See supra note 64 and accompanying text
(challenging the Court's recognition of national defense and the national policy
against racial discrimination in education as "compelling" state interests); supra
notes 74-97 (criticizing recognition of a compelling state interest in an exemption-
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board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded,... society
... would be courting anarchy."?0 Justice Scalia warns, "iI]t is horri-
ble to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against
the importance of general laws the significance of religious prac-
tice,"171 a process that becomes increasingly dangerous "in direct pro-
portion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its
determination to coerce or suppress none of them."172
Although generally accurate, Justice Scalia's point is slightly over-
stated. It is true that in the area of differential treatment on the basis
of race, strict scrutiny is applied only to instances of intentional racial
discrimination, and not to government actions having only a racially
disproportionate impact.17 3 In the area of freedom of speech, how-
ever, heightened scrutiny has been applied in some instances where
the regulation has a restrictive effect without more.1 74
McConnell argues that Justice Scalia's aversion to the scope of ju-
dicial discretion in the balancing process is in tension with "most areas
of constitutional law."175
There is no particular reason to believe that judgments under the Free Exer-
cise Clause are any more discretionary or prone to judicial abuse than judg-
ments under the Commerce Clause, the Due Process Clause, or the Free
Speech Clause, to take a few examples from the current catalog of compelling
interest or balancing tests. Unless Smith is the harbinger of a wholesale re-
treat from judicial discretion across the range of constitutional law, there
free tax system); see also McConnell, supra note 97, at 1127 ("it must be conceded
that the Supreme Court before Smith did not really apply a genuine 'compelling
interest' test").
170. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1605
(1990).
171. Id at 1606 n.5.
172. I& at 1605.
173. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
174. See Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943)(government regulation of handbills and
littering); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939); and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938). See also United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)(the effect of a statute "unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression" upon communicative activity may be "no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of" the government interest); Choper, Thoughts on
State Action: The "Government Function" and "Power Theory"Approaches, 1979
WASH. U.L.Q. 757, 766 ("state action also may be held to abridge freedom of
speech even though the purpose of the challenged legal restraint is not directed
to suppressing communication, but rather is intended to accomplish some in-
dependent, nonspeech-related regulatory end.") Another exception would likely
be found in connection with other favored substantive constitutional rights (such
as the right to privacy or the right to vote on an equal basis), where heightened
scrutiny would probably be applied to government regulations in the absence of
any indication that the government intended the burdensome effects to occur.
See, e.g., Choper, The Requirement of Intentional Discrimination, in 2 J. CHoPER,
Y. KAmsAR & L. TRIBE, THE SuPREME CouRT TRENDs AND DEvELoPMENSM
1979-80, 9, 26-27 (1980).
175. McConnell, supra note 97, at 1144.
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should be some explanation of why the problem in this field is more acute
than it is elsewhere.
1 7 6
Although the process of exercising judicial discretion is no more
unrestrained or subject to abuse in the religious liberty context than
in other constitutional areas, a comparison of the potential scope of
free exercise balancing with the constitutional areas McConnell men-
tions demonstrates that there is special reason for seeking to limit ju-
dicial discretion in the former instance. First, it is true that judicial
oversight of state regulations under the commerce clause potentially
involves a great many cases and invokes a process of ad hoc balancing,
often accompanied with substantial interjection of judicial policy
predilections. There is an important difference, however, between
commerce clause adjudication and judicial review under the free exer-
cise clause:
When the Court rules on a contention that state or local laws... improperly
impose upon domains over which the national government is empowered
(usually the areas of interstate or foreign commerce and thus violative of the
commerce clause...).... the Court does not exercise the momentous power of
judicial review .... [Tihe Court does not speak the final constitutional word.
The federal political branches do. The Court's decisions on the federalism
limits on state's actions may be revised by ordinary federal statutes.17 7
Second, regarding the scope of judicial balancing under the due
process clause, McConnell appears to be referring to procedural due
process cases such as Mathews v. Eldridge.17s But the Court has not
applied its balancing test here beyond the quite restricted context of
government deprivations of constitutionally protected liberty or prop-
erty interests.179 As for judicial balancing on substantive due process
issues, the Court has repeatedly refused to apply a balancing test
outside the narrow context of privacy interests in child rearing and
education, family relationships, procreation, marriage, contraception
and abortion. 8 0
Finally, turning to freedom of speech, the use of judicial balancing
is greatly limited in this area. Laws that directly regulate speech or
that make the exercise of free speech rights more burdensome1 8l are
relatively rare, comprising only a tiny fraction of the total number of
government regulations in effect. In contrast, if under the free exer-
cise clause the courts were to apply strict scrutiny to every govern-
176. 1&
177. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A FUNC-
TIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 207 (1980).
178. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
179. W. LOCKHART, Y. KAmisAp, J. CHOPER & S. SHIFFRIN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS 632-44 (7th ed. 1991).
180. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986)(homosexual activity); Whalen v.
Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)(names of persons obtaining certain drugs).
181. As in the effect of antilittering ordinances upon dissemination of handbills. See
supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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ment regulation having the effect of restricting individual religious
freedom, because of the diversity of religious beliefs in the United
States-a phenomenon which appears likely to increase-virtually
"every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the
highest order" would be open to challenge; "religious exemptions
from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind" could be con-
stitutionally required.18 2 Even the most common and mundane gov-
ernment requirements, such as photographs on driver's licenses, 8 3
Social Security numbers,18 4 and such activities as building roads 8 5 or
running a selective service system,186 can conflict with religious be-
liefs. Government regulations do not intrude upon commerce clause,
due process clause, or free speech clause interests with nearly such
breadth. Nor does one's approval of the results reached by courts
granting exemptions from government regulations on free exercise
groundsl87 mean that the courts would not be more deeply involved
here than in other areas.
Sympathizing with Justice Scalia's concern, however, does not
mean that limiting principles cannot be found (though none is com-
pletely free of flaws). At a minimum, the Court has required that reli-
gious beliefs must be in "good faith" or sincerely held.8 There is also
the approach that the conduct for which an exemption is sought must
involve a central tenet of one's religious beliefs.'8 9 Finally, as I have
suggested elsewhere, the Court could limit its review to situations
where the individual's religious belief carries extratemporal
consequences. 190
182. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1605
(1990). Justice O'Connor has expressed a similar concern in the establishment
clause context: "[C]haos would ensue" if every government regulation "that os-
tensibly promotes a secular interest [but] ... has an incidental or even a primary
effect of helping or hindering a sectarian belief" were invalid. Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 69-70 (1985)(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
183. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by equally divided court
sub nom, Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
184. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
185. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
186. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
187. See McConnell, supra note 97, at 1142-43.
188. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 84 (1944). See also Thomas v. Review Bd.,
450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981)('"The narrow function of a reviewing court... is to deter-
mine whether... petitioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction
that such work was forbidden by his religion.")
189. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Ceme-
tery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 474 (1988)(Brennan, J., dissenting)("I believe
it appropriate, therefore, to require some showing of 'centrality' before the Gov-
ernment can be required either to come forward with a compelling justification
for its proposed use of federal land or to forego that use altogether.")
190. For the suggestion that the expectation of extratemporal consequences could be
used as a limiting principle to free exercise claims, see Choper, supra note 6, at
597:
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In addition, there are other devices available that may reduce the
impact of traditional free exercise doctrine on the government's ordi-
nary ability to regulate. Just as Congress has required religious objec-
tors to military service to engage in alternative forms of service, and
state lawmaking bodies have required that religious objectors to Sun-
day closing laws remain closed on their Sabbath rather than on Sun-
day, courts could suggest that an alternative burden be imposed upon
individuals granted religious exemptions that does not conflict with
their beliefs. The precise contours of the alternative burden would
have to vary with differing contexts, of course. But in this manner,
religious objectors would be relieved of pressures to violate their be-
liefs, and would not markedly benefit from their religious scruples rel-
ative to others. This would minimize any incentive to file fraudulent
claims, and reduce the likelihood that government exemption would
induce people to adopt certain beliefs, thus avoiding establishment
clause problems.191 Religious conduct would be accommodated with-
out risking a potentially overwhelming number of free exercise
challenges.
V. THE REMAINING PROTECTION OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
UNDER THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
An important question concerns the extent of protection that re-
mains for religious liberty after Smith, apart from the security af-
forded by free speech principles. First, some observers have found a
promising potential avenue in Justice Scalia's contention that there is
a category of "hybrid" free exercise claims which remain covered by
the test of strict scrutiny. 192 The hybrid category could include combi-
[A] forceful explanation and pragmatic justification for the free exercise
clause's special exemption from otherwise universal governmental regu-
lation is the fact that the commands of religious belief, at least as conven-
tionally perceived, have a unique significance for the believer, thus
making it particularly cruel for the government to require the believer
to choose between violating those commands and suffering meaningful
temporal disabilities.
As evidence that no limiting principle is without shortcomings, see Greenawalt,
Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CALIF. L. REv. 753, 803-04 (1984);
Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41
STAN. L. REv. 233, 274-77 (1989); Note, Religion and Morality Legislation: A Re-
examination of Establishment Clause Analysis, 59 N.Y.U. L. REv. 301, 346-52
(1984); Note, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment: A Functional Ap-
proach, 74 CoRNELL L. REv. 532 (1989).
191. "[Ihe Establishment Clause should forbid government action that ... is likely to
result in coercing, compromising, or influencing religious beliefs. ... [An Estab-
lishment Clause problem arises when] the advantage for religion... [is] so great
as to impermissibly induce nonbelievers to profess religious belief and ultimately
undergo genuine conversions." Choper, supra note 112, at 686, 698 (1980).
192. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 150, at 47; Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness
in Establishment and Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 354 (1991).
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nations of free exercise rights with such other constitutionally based
liberties as the right of parents to control their children's education-
the right that Justice Scalia maintains was recognized in Yoder 193-- or
perhaps with the right to refuse medical treatment discussed in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health.94 I do not think
that the notion of a hybrid category holds much promise, however, for
the reasons stated earlier.195 This prediction has been confirmed by
lower federal and state courts, which have acknowledged the doc-
trine's existence but have not relied on it to uphold a claim of constitu-
tional violation that could not have been sustained without the free
exercise clause.19 6
Second, one could infer from several passages in the opinion that
193. See supra text accompanying notes 165-66.
194. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). The Cruzan majority simply assumed that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to refuse
medical treatment. Id. at 2851-52. Five Justices, however, expressly supported
the view that the Constitution affords heightened protection for the right to re-
fuse medical treatment. Id. at 2856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 2865
(Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting); and id. at 2885-86 (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
195. See supra notes 156-66 and accompanying text.
196. Although no free exercise claimant has yet successfully invoked the "hybrid
claims" exception in federal court, four courts of appeal have recognized it. See
Vandiver v. Harding County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927,932-33 (6th Cir. 1991)(find-
ing no constitutionally protected interest other than free exercise claim impli-
cated); American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941 F.2d 808, 810-f1
(9th Cir. 1991)(holding that an employer's "right to hire" 'as been accorded in-
sufficient constitutional protection to place it alongside the cases Smith cites as
examples of 'hybrid claims.' "); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys
Center, 940 F.2d 1295, 1305 (9th Cir. 1991)(declining to rule on applicability of
exception because even if it were found to apply, government would prevail
under test of strict scrutiny); Intercommunity Center for Justice and Peace v.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 910 F.2d 42, 44-45 (2d Cir. 1990)(recogniz-
ing the exception but finding that "[n]o such hybrid concerns are at issue here.");
Salvation Army v. Department of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 200-01 (3d
Cir. 1990)(remanding for further proceedings regarding possible infringement of
freedom to associate for free speech purposes, which in combination with free
exercise claim could form valid hybrid).
At the state court level, the "hybrid claims" exception was successfully in-
voked in Zummo v. Zummo, 394 Pa. Super. 30, 574 A.2d 1130 (1990), but the deci-
sion could just as effectively have rested on the right recognized in Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, see supra notes 160-163 and accompanying text. The case in-
volved a father's challenge to a court order prohibiting him from taking his chil-
dren to religious services over the mother's objection that her faith conflicted
with that of the father. In finding for the father, Zummo cited Yoder for the
rule, applicable in cases involving hybrids of free exercise and parental rights,
that "parental authority in matters of religious upbringing may be encroached
upon, only upon a showing of a 'substantial threat' of 'physical or mental harm to
the child, or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare."' Zummo v. Zummo,
394 Pa. Super. 30, 47, 574 A.2d 1130, 1138 (1990)(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205, 230 (1972)).
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its highly restrictive approach to the free exercise clause is applicable
only to criminal laws.197 I doubt that this will prove to be a serious
limitation on the Smith holding. 98 In many instances, Justice Scalia
simply speaks of "generally applicable" laws without mentioning this
factor.199 Moreover, criminal prohibitions of religious conduct are
generally considered to require a higher level of scrutiny and to pres-
ent a stronger case for recognizing a free exercise exemption than civil
regulations, mainly because criminal penalties can be more burden-
some, as in the case of imprisonment, and because an individual con-
victed of a criminal violation must endure a social stigma unassociated
with civil sanctions.200
Third, Justice Scalia suggests that a special category exists for
cases arising in contexts like that of unemployment compensation that
lend themselves to "individualized governmental assessment" of free
exercise claims. This exception, however, if rigorously applied, would
197. To illustrate, at various points the opinion speaks in terms of Oregon's "general
criminal prohibition," "generally applicable criminal laws," and "an across-the-
board criminal prohibition." Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v.
Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1597, 1602-03 (1990).
198. The Third Circuit expressly rejected this limitation on the scope of the holding in
Smith in Salvation Army v. Dep't of Community Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 194-96 (3d
Cir. 1990). After proposing its first three reasons for rejecting the criminal/civil
distinction, the Salvation Army Court added:
Finally, and most importantly, the rationale of the Smith opinion is not
logically confined to cases involving criminal statutes. Justice Scalia's
primary argument is a structural analysis of the effect of the compelling
interest test .... "[What the 'compelling government interest' test]
would produce... [in the free exercise area]-a private right to ignore
generally applicable laws-is a constitutional anomaly." We see no reason
why application of the compelling interest test to free exercise exemp-
tion claims concerning criminal statutes would be any more of a "consti-
tutional anomaly" than application to civil statutes.
Id at 195-96 (citation omitted).
The Sixth Circuit followed Salvation Army in Vandiver, agreeing that "the
Supreme Court would not 'have been as concerned as it was to distinguish and
explain numerous previous free exercise cases that address "civil" statutes' were
the Smith holding limited to the criminal context alone." Vandiver v. Board of
Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 932 (6th Cir. 1991)(quoting Salvation Army v. Dep't of Com-
munity Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 195 (3d Cir. 1990)). For additional cases, see Lupu,
Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Ac-
commodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 572 n.56 (1991).
199. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1600, 1601,
1603 (1990).
200. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961). The Court's holding in Smith I
is itself premised upon the view that if criminal penalties are found to be permis-
sible, then it logically follows that civil sanctions are permissible as well:
For if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of
religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it
certainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unem-
ployment compensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct.
Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670 (1988).
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apply in most free exercise cases, as demonstrated above.20 ' Indeed,
Justice Scalia's argument for this exception is difficult to reconcile
with the result in Smith itself.202 This exception thus seems to hold
little promise.203
Smith does, however, expressly preserve three separate substan-
tive areas of free exercise protection. First, Justice Scalia acknowl-
edges that the government may not deliberately discriminate by
imposing "special disabilities on the basis of religious views or reli-
gious status."20 4 In this regard, the courts would handle the free exer-
cise claim in much the same way as a claim of intentional racial
discrimination or regulation of speech on the basis of content. Stat-
utes employing religious classifications, such as the statute in McDan-
iel v. Paty, however, are highly unusual. It remains to be seen
whether the Court is still willing to find violations of the free exercise
clause (or establishment clause) 205 in respect to facially neutral laws
that have a markedly disproportionate impact on some religions.20 6
Second, Justice Scalia points out that the government may not
question the validity of religious beliefs and "punish the expression of
religious doctrines it believes to be false."207 Third, he observes that
religious organizations enjoy certain immunities from judicial scrutiny
201. See supra notes 147-155 and accompanying text.
202. As McConnell observes:
If Smith is viewed as an unemployment compensation case, the distinc-
tion is obviously spurious. If Smith is viewed as a hypothetical criminal
prosecution for peyote use, there would be an individual governmental
assessment of the defendants' motives and actions in the form of a crimi-
nal trial.
McConnell, supra note 97, at 1124.
203. Three federal courts of appeal have acknowledged the "individualized govern-
mental assessment" exception, but no free exercise claimant has yet invoked it
successfully. See Vandiver v. Harding County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 933-34
(6th Cir. 1991) (no evidence that challenger's religious beliefs affected the exercise
of official discretion); American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941
F.2d 808, 811 (9th Cir. 1991) (exception inapplicable because statute involved "does
not set up a procedure for exemptions based on 'individualized governmental as-
sessment' "); National Labor Relations Bd. v. Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d 1295,
1305 (9th Cir. 1991)(no ruling on applicability of exception because even if it were
found to apply, government would prevail under test of strict scrutiny); In-
tercommunity Center for Justice and Peace v. Immigration and Naturalization
Serv., 910 F.2d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 1990)(exception inapplicable because statute in-
volved "does not provide for a discretionary exemption that is applied in a man-
ner that fails to accommodate free exercise concerns.").
204. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599
(1990)(citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978)(state may not bar members of
the clergy from serving as state legislators)).
205. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). See also Choper, supra note 48, at 957-
961.
206. See Williams & Williams, supra note 121, at 889-896.
207. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599
(1990)(citing United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-88 (1944)(religious fun-
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of the decisions of the religious authorities, e.g., the government may
not decide which of competing factions within a religious organization
owns (and may use) the organization's facilities by lending "its power
to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or
dogma."2 08
Yet there are potential alternative sources for constitutional pro-
tection of the second and third types of free exercise interests:
The free speech clause has been interpreted to place definite strictures on the
state's ability to penalize or award civil damages for the making of false state-
ments.... [In addition, t]here is much to be said for interpreting the freedom
of association guarantee to mandate... [a] rule of judicial deference for all
intra-organizational disputes involving the ideological tenets of the group. 2 0 9
Therefore, the scope of the free exercise clause has receded far from
the high-water mark of Yoder,21 0 now offering only one form of im-
munity that is in no way available under the speech and association
provisions of the first amendment: protection against express govern-
ment discrimination on the basis of religion. Yet the establishment
clause has been interpreted to provide this type of protection as
well,2 11 which means that the free exercise clause now offers virtually
no unique form of constitutional protection.
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF SMITH
This major change in free exercise protection will probably have
little effect upon future results in the Supreme Court, because despite
its former doctrine, the Court generally did not protect free exercise
interests significantly. But Smith will have a major impact upon the
disposition of free exercise claims in the lower federal and state
courts, which were taking the compelling government interest test se-
riously and requiring exemptions for religious activities in a substan-
tial number of cases each year.
draisers cannot be punished for communication of allegedly fraudulent religious
beliefs)).
208. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1599
(1990)(citing, among others, Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445-52 (1969)(civil courts may not
interpret religious doctrine in order to resolve internal disputes of religious
organizations)).
209. Choper, supra note 6, at 586.
210. See supra notes 35-51 and accompanying text.
211. E.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)("The clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially pre-
ferred over another."); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 450 (1971)("[A]s a
general matter it is surely true that the Establishment Clause prohibits govern-
ment from abandoning secular purposes in order to put an imprimatur on one
religion, or on religion as such, or to favor the adherents of any sect or religious
organization."). In addition, the due process clause of the fifth amendment has
been interpreted to bar federal discrimination on the basis of religion. United
States v. Sisson, 297 F.Supp. 902, 910-11 (D. Mass. 1969).
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Although limits to, or modifications of, the Court's former doctrine
were needed, the Smith approach is too unprotective of religious lib-
erty. Virtually all possibilities for government accommodation of free
exercise interests now depend completely on the political process.
This result, as Justice Scalia admitted, "may fairly be said... [to] place
at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely
engaged in . .. "212 In my view, this places smaller, less influential
religious groups at too great a disadvantage. There is too great a risk
that such groups, left without judicial recourse when generally appli-
cable government regulations threaten to infringe upon their religious
liberty, will be subjected to serious restrictions upon their ability to
practice their beliefs.213
The problem may be illustrated by the facts of Smith itself. The
Native Americans believed in the use of peyote as a sacramental act;
much more was at stake than some general religious tenet regarding
the propriety of a particular course of conduct outside the sphere of
religious worship (such as religious beliefs regarding school attend-
ance or military service). On the other hand, the government's inter-
est in criminal prohibition of religious peyote use appears to be rather
insignificant.214 Indeed, at the time that Smith was decided, Oregon
itself had only once sought to prosecute for religious peyote use.2 15
Further, it is difficult to reconcile a ban on the use of peyote by mem-
bers of the Native American Church with the statutory exemption
granted the sacramental use of wine for Catholics and Jews during
Prohibition.
The fact that twenty-three states and the federal government ex-
empt the sacramental use of peyote from their criminal laws may indi-
cate, however, that judicial review is not that important; legislatures
apparently will take care of the problem. On the other hand, those
legislative exemptions may themselves have been adopted in response
to the holding of the California Supreme Court in People v. Woody216
that individuals using peyote for religious reasons could not be prose-
cuted criminally, a holding based on the first amendment and greatly
influenced by Sherbert v. Verner.217
212. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1606
(1990).
213. For careful assessments of the potential impact of Smith upon religious freedom,
see Laycock, supra note 147, at 12, 56; McConnell, The Origins and Historical
Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REv. 1409, 1419 (1990).
214. See the detailed discussion supra note 138.
215. Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 1595, 1617 n.3
(1990)(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(referring to State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794 537
P.2d 142 (1975), cert denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976)).
216. 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964).
217. The Congressional Record indicates that, when Congress decided to exempt the
religious use of peyote from the Drug Abuse Control Amendments of 1965, it did
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More broadly, the abandonment of judicial review of generally ap-
plicable laws that restrict religious conduct presents a significant prob-
lem that Justice Scalia's opinion does not adequately consider:
legislatures are highly imperfect protectors of individual constitu-
tional rights. Legislatures can be careless, insensitive or even overtly
hostile to particular religious interests, they can be unaware of certain
religious needs because a group is obscure or inadequately organized,
or they may simply not have the time to consider a religious exemp-
tion request, all to the same effect.21 8 "For a variety of reasons, there-
fore, we cannot always rely on legislatures to protect minority
religious conduct."21 9 Courts are imperfect, too, but judicial review at
least provides religious groups and individuals a second chance to be
heard.220
VII. CONCLUSION
Without judicial review of generally applicable laws, governmental
regulation would be permitted to intrude into too wide a range of ar-
eas of religious life in the United States.2 21 In my view, rather than
so in response to Woody. See Smith v. Employment Division, 307 Or. 68, 74-75,
763 P.2d 146, 149 (1988).
218. Laycock, Forna, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1015-16 (1990).
219. Id. at 1016. Congress has been considering the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act, which would reverse the doctrinal effects of Smith by requiring free exercise
exemptions unless the government:
demonstrates that application of the burden to the person -
(A) is essential to further a compelling governmental interest; and
(B) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, HR 2797, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(LEXIS, Genfed library, Bltext file).
Whether Congress has power under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment to
enact a bill like the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is discussed in Choper,
Congressional Power to Expand Judicial Definitions of the Substantive Terms of
the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN. L. REv. 299 (1982). On the other hand,
given the likelihood that state-enacted free exercise exemptions would differ
from one another and thus result in a nationwide pattern of religiously based
discrimination, Congress might base the Religious Freedom Restoration Act on
its commerce power, the clause upon which the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
amendment to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act was based. Constitutional
Law Conference, 59 U.S.L.W. 2272, 2280 (1990)(reporting the view of Professor
Laurence H. Tribe). In the event the bill passes and a court is called upon to
strike down a state restriction on religious practices, the court would be inter-
preting an act of Congress rather than scrutinizing the state rule under the free
exercise clause.
220. J. CHOPER, supra note 177, at 60-128; Laycock, supra note 150, at 10-16.
221. In Professor Douglas Laycock's view, foreseeable (and in some cases pending)
governmental intrusions include the subjection of religious organizations to most
forms of taxation, the regulation and review of the employment and disciplinary
policies of religious organizations, the regulation of religious schools and home
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abandoning its traditional role of judicial review, the Court should ap-
ply heightened scrutiny for the purpose of granting an exemption in
defined types of free exercise cases: (1) granting the exemption must
not violate the establishment clause;222 (2) the exemption must not
require the government to abandon its entire regulatory program;223
(3) the individual's beliefs must be sincerely held;224 (4) any violation
of those beliefs must entail extratemporal consequences;225 and (5)
the court could suggest that an alternative burden be imposed.226
Some problems would appear to be quite easy to decide under this
approach. For example, if a student seeks an exemption from a
school's uniform dress policy for gym class because her religious be-
liefs forbid her to bare her legs, 2 27 or if an individual views the picture
on a driver's license as a graven image forbidden by the second com-
mandment,228 exemptions should be granted. The government has
only the most modest interest in religious objectors being forced to
conform to such regulations.229 By contrast, a plainly overpowering
state interest in children's health is implicated when, for religious rea-
sons, parents neglect to provide medical care for serious medical needs
of their children, and exemptions in such circumstances should be
denied.
Other cases are less readily soluble. When, as in Yoder, an individ-
ual objects for religious reasons to attending high school, or, as in Gil-
lette, to being drafted; or when, as in Smith, an individual seeks to use
mind altering drugs for sacramental purposes;23 0 or when, as in Bob
Jones, a religious organization engages in discrimination on the basis
of race (or sex), one may debate whether or not the government has a
sufficiently strong interest at stake. In such closer cases, there is
much to commend McConnell's formulation of the test of heightened
scrutiny: "Is the governmental interest so important that the govern-
schooling, the imposition of public school curricula offensive to religious belief,
the requirement of zoning board approval for new ministries, the imposition of
minimum wage laws upon religious employers, and the application of equal access
regulations to religious facilities. Laycock, supra note 150, at 39-41, 43-44, 47, 56.
222. See supra notes 112 and 191.
223. See supra text accompanying note 120.
224. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
225. See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
227. Mitchell v. McCall, 273 Ala. 604, 143 So.2d 629 (1962).
228. Quaring v. Peterson, 728 F.2d 1121 (8th Cir. 1984), aff'd by equally divided court
sub nom., Jensen v. Quaring, 472 U.S. 478 (1985).
229. See also State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990)(state law requiring
that slow-moving vehicles display special emblem, as applied to Amish buggy-
driver).
230. Assuming that, unlike the plaintiffs in Smith, the individual has not voluntary
promised to refrain from using peyote under circumstances in which the state has
an important interest in preventing drug use; see supra text accompanying note
140.
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ment would impose a burden of this magnitude on the majority in or-
der to achieve it?"231 Careful application of such a formulation would
ensure that minority religious groups are not subjected to curtailment
of their religious freedom simply because they lack the influence that
mainstream groups can bring to bear upon the legislative process, and
would probably result in upholding the free exercise claim in most
instances.
231. McConnell, supra note 97, at 1147.
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